Nghiên cứu về cơ chế quản trị, chất lượng kiểm toán và quản trị lợi nhuận: Trường hợp các công ty niêm yết Việt Nam

y có những quy định niêm yết và thị trường khác nhau. 
7 Kết luận 
Nghiên cứu này đánh giá sự tác động của cơ chế quản trị công ty và chất lượng kiểm 
toán lên mức quản trị lợi nhuận tại các công ty niêm yết Việt Nam. Với 663 biến quan sát 
(221 công ty – 3 năm), kết quả nghiên cứu cho thấy công ty có tỷ lệ sở hữu của cổ đông nhà 
nước và nước ngoài cao hơn và công ty thuê kiểm toán thuộc nhóm Big4 có mức quản trị lợi 
nhuận thấp hơn. Trong khi đó, công ty có số lượng thành viên thuộc ban kiểm soát không phải 
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là cổ đông (số lượng này tỷ lệ nghịch với số lượng thành viên là các cổ đông) càng cao thì có 
mức quản trị lợi nhuận cao hơn. Nghiên cứu này có nhiều đóng góp cho lý thuyết khi đây là 
nghiên cứu đ u tiên về sự tác động của cả cơ chế kiểm soát bên trong (thành ph n sở hữu công 
ty, đ c điểm hội đồng quản trị và đ c điểm ban kiểm soát) và cơ chế kiểm soát bên ngoài (kiểm 
toán độc lập) lên mức quản lợi nhuận của công ty. Đồng thời nghiên cứu này đưa ra một vài gợi 
ý cho các công ty niêm yết Việt Nam và Chính phủ Việt Nam trong việc nâng cao hiệu quả kiểm 
soát của cơ chế quản trị công ty trong các công ty niêm yết. 
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THE RESEARCH OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AUDIT 
QUALITY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF 
LISTED FIRMS IN VIETNAM 
Ho Thi Thuy Nga*, Pham Thi Bich Ngoc 
University of Economics, Hue University, 99 Ho Dac Di St., Hue, Vietnam 
Abstract: This study analyzes the impact of corporate governance and audit quality on earnings 
management of listed firms in Vietnam. The data were collected from FiinPro database, annual 
reports, financial reports, and corporate governance reports of 221 companies listed on both Ho 
Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchanges from 2015 to 2017. The tests indicate that the random 
effect model is most appropriate with the panel data of this study (663 firm-year observations). 
The results show that corporate governance mechanisms including the ownership ratio of state 
shareholders, the ownership ratio of foreign shareholders, and the number of members of the 
control committee who are not shareholders have impacts on earnings management, while the 
proportion of independent members in the board of directors has no effects. In addition, the 
firms audited by Big4 (Big4 auditing firms have higher audit quality than those of non-Big4) 
have lower earnings management than those audited by non-Big4. This study is a supplement 
to the limited research on the earnings management of listed Vietnamese firms and has 
contributed to the management practices that enhance the role of corporate governance in 
monitoring the company's activities, thereby limiting earnings management and improving the 
transparency of financial information of listed firms in Vietnam. 
Keywords: corporate governance, audit quality, earnings management, listed firms in Vietnam